The New Resource Geopolitics: Critical Minerals, Chips, and the Scramble for Supply-Chain Resilience

The materials that make modern technology possible — gallium for chips, rare earths for magnets, cobalt and lithium for batteries — have become some of the most contested assets in geopolitics. What was once a quiet corner of industrial procurement is now a front line, where access to a handful of elements can shape national security, AI ambitions, and the future of clean energy.

A concentrated market is a vulnerable one

The core problem is concentration. China is the dominant supplier across a swathe of critical minerals, serving as the major source for 14 of the 33 minerals the United States relies on most heavily, including gallium, tungsten, and rare earths. Projections suggest the dominance could deepen: by 2035, China may supply more than 60% of refined lithium and cobalt, around 80% of battery-grade graphite and rare earths, and roughly 70% of battery-grade manganese.

That concentration is increasingly wielded as leverage. In October 2025, China introduced its most sweeping export controls to date, modelled on the extraterritorial logic of US technology rules: foreign-made products containing even trace amounts of Chinese-origin rare earths, or made using Chinese processing technology, could require a licence. After both sides pulled back at the APEC summit in Busan — suspending some measures while preserving the underlying legal architecture — Beijing expanded its control catalogue again in early 2026. The episode showed how durable and adjustable this form of pressure has become.

The Western response: build, friend-shore, stockpile

The counter-strategy is taking shape along three lines: reshoring production at home, building strategic reserves, and “friend-shoring” through partnerships with trusted suppliers. In early 2026, the United States stood up Project Vault, a dedicated critical-mineral reserve, and hosted a Critical Minerals Ministerial that produced new bilateral frameworks and launched a multilateral engagement forum. This built on a wave of bilateral deals — including a 2025 rare-earths framework with Australia carrying a billion-dollar financing commitment — and on partnership agreements reaching across Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and beyond.

The semiconductor link makes the stakes concrete. Advanced chip manufacturing depends on a reliable flow of gallium, germanium, and rare earths, so reshoring fabs is meaningless without securing the upstream materials and chemicals that feed them. Increasingly, policymakers treat the chip supply chain and the mineral supply chain as one problem.

Why Southeast Asia matters

This realignment has direct implications for the region. As buyers actively diversify away from single-source dependence, Southeast Asian economies with mineral endowments and processing ambitions become strategic nodes in the new map — both as suppliers and as destinations for capital seeking trusted, diversified supply. Indonesia’s command of nickel processing is the most visible example, but the broader opportunity spans the refining, logistics, and partnership infrastructure that a “secure, diversified, and resilient” supply chain requires.

The advisory takeaway

For corporates and investors, resource strategy is no longer a procurement footnote — it is a board-level question of resilience. The practical priorities are clear: map exposure to single-source dependencies, secure multi-jurisdictional sourcing before disruption forces the issue, and treat strategic stockpiles, offtake agreements, and processing partnerships as core risk management. In a world where minerals are instruments of policy, supply-chain resilience is competitive advantage.

This article is part of GK Group’s Strategic Industries series. Figures reflect publicly reported data available at time of writing.